Introduction
Perhaps one of the most ambitious development projects in recent history will be the roll-out of the 900bn US$ Belt and Road Initiative[i]. China’s goal to become the leading world power will not only increase China’s global role, it will also have decisive impacts for the Middle East as the region is an integral part of the Western axis of the BRI. This requires adapted security and foreign policies in the Middle East to utilize the opportunities from BRI but also to manage the risks of a world, which is further shifting towards the East in the coming years and decades. If the Middle East positions itself carefully, it can greatly benefit from this shifting world order. In order for this to happen, the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) must understand their crucial role to steer the Middle East in this geopolitical transition.
What is the Belt and Road Initiative
During official state visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia, China’s President Xi Jinping announced the Belt and Road Initiative in the autumn of 2013. With its objectives ‘to construct a unified large market and make full use of both international and domestic markets, through cultural exchange and integration, to enhance mutual understanding and trust of member nations, ending up in an innovative pattern with capital inflows, talent pool and technology database‘, the BRI is one of the largest infrastructure projects in history covering two thirds of the world’s population across 68 countries[ii].
It is divided in a main axis with two wings, one in the West and the other one in the East. While the main axis integrates much of Central Asia, the Indian sub-continent, the ASEAN countries and Oceania, the Eastern wing is largely confined to Latin and Central America. The by far most ambitious part of the BRI will be the Western wing as it seeks to integrate three highly diverse world regions in terms of economic prosperity, political systems, culture and population growth: Africa, Europe and the Middle East.
China seeks to connect the countries along the Western axis mainly through infrastructure developments such as new roads, maritime infrastructure and railways. This is intended to reduce export and import time for countries trading with China. In particular, the Western axis is based on railway and road networks from China to Western Europe and through maritime routes to Africa. A key element within the maritime strategy is to build ports such as in Gwadar (Pakistan) and Lamu (Kenya) to establish faster trade between the two world regions[iii]. In the Arab world, Egypt is considered as the key beneficiary of the maritime part of the BRI as the Suez Canal will once again see an increase of shipping movements. Another country to benefit will be Iran as a corridor for railways. It already enjoys close political relationships with Beijing[iv]. However, this also means that the BRI will have profound geopolitical implications for the MENA region.
Geopolitical impacts on the Middle East
MENA will be the de-facto energy hub for the Western axis if not for the entire BRI. GCC States will once again be able to bring their hydrocarbon assets to the table to energize the initiative. At the same time, ports in the GCC are expected to benefit from increased shipments of oil and gas to the East and Africa. This provides the region with both opportunities but also more challenges. The geostrategic bottleneck of the Strait of Hormuz will yet again increase. Maritime security will not only remain a key challenge there but also in the Arab Sea and the Red Sea as vessels will have to be protected from pirates. The lack of maritime institutions in the Indian Ocean region will further add to the challenges of governments in the MENA region as countries have no political mechanism to avoid competition. Hence, GCC governments will further have to invest in their military to procure the necessary infrastructure to protect their sea routes.
Risks and Opportunities of the BRI for MENA
This may further increase existing tensions between the GCC and Iran as both actors in the region may have opposing interests. In an increasingly armed region, such diverging interests increase the risk of sustained conflict, either directly or through proxies. Moreover, terrorist activity could severely impact successful trade in the other bottleneck: the Suez Canal[v]. There will therefore be no alternative for the GCC economies to provide further strategic aid to Egypt to maintain stability in the Arab Republic. Moreover, America’s future role in the MENA region will add to the complexities: with sustained low oil prices, America’s ambition for energy independence may be in jeopardy, requiring it to maintain a military presence in the Gulf, while China may decide to send further troops to the MENA region to protect its interests. This may have a potential for political competition with Washington. Last but not least, Russia’s increasing presence in the Levant and Turkey’s geopolitical interests will add to the political tinder box. This will all have to be carefully managed through political institutions across countries in the region.
However, there are of course other, currently untapped opportunities resulting from the BRI. China may or may not decide to increase its military presence in the region. If it doesn’t, as the stakes could be too high to confront the United States, the GCC in particular will have a window of opportunity to establish themselves as a political actor within the Western axis of the BRI. This means nothing less but a new geopolitical role for the MENA region. It can choose to use its intermediary geographical location and position as the key energy provider to China but also Africa to set itself up as a global player akin to Europe or North America.
Conclusions
The BRI will define the coming years and decades in many countries of the world. The MENA region is affected in a number of ways. The GCC are likely to remain a key energy provider in such a new world order, yet it will have to address potential conflict areas such as intraregional rivalries, maritime security and terrorism. The region will have to manage the risks but also the opportunities such as becoming a vital political actor within the Western axis of the BRI. Such shifts will not be easy to navigate but they present the region with an opportunity to transform itself to a global player that can grow as part of the BRI.
[i] Deloitte, 2018. Embracing the BRI Ecosystem in 2018. Online: https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/economy/asia-pacific/china-belt-and-road-initiative.html
[ii] Tsang Group, 2019. What is One Belt One Road Initiatve. Online: https://tsangsgroup.co/areas-of-expertise/what-is-one-belt-one-road-initiative/
[iii] Deloitte, 2018. Embracing the BRI Ecosystem in 2018. Online: https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/economy/asia-pacific/china-belt-and-road-initiative.html
[iv] Maha S. Kamel (2018) China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for the Middle East, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 31:1, 76-95, DOI: 10.1080/09557571.2018.1480592
[v] Ibid