Both countries should not, however, be considered through the same lens. India has a larger dependency on the Gulf and greater foreign policy proximity to the United States than China. India and the Gulf further have deeper cultural and historical ties that link their population together. While China does not have the same historic proximity to the Gulf, its larger financial clout, expertise in large-scale infrastructure deployment and growing technological edge make it an indispensable partner to the GCC countries. Yet China’s intensifying proximity to Iran may pose a conundrum to some GCC countries.
Regional policymakers need to ensure that China’s and India’s antagonistic relationship is not projected in the Gulf. To achieve this, they should pursue a balanced relationship with each, avoid
“picking sides”, and where possible, encourage them to cooperate rather than compete in the commercial and security realms.

From an optimistic perspective, while competition is inevitable in meeting economic, political and strategic objectives, there is nothing stopping the two countries from cooperating and avoiding confrontation to maximise not only mutual but also plurilateral benefits. The GCC countries, despite their differences on various issues, should exploit these openings by continuing their pragmatic and
multi-aligned foreign policies.

However, in recent years the Gulf States have demonstrated that they have the ability to amplify the political discussion around existing tensions in the Mediterranean, and shift the strategic rules of the game. As historical rivals Greece and Turkey square off against each other, competing for maritime space, and increasingly adopting strategies of containment and encirclement, the Gulf states (particularly Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE) have lent their financial, military and diplomatic weight, thereby connecting two seemingly disparate parts of the world together in ways that have not been seen before.

While the scope and scale of the Gulf’s engagement with Europe is unprecedented, the debate is not necessarily new. The Gulf States as a collective have tried to engage with NATO on a number of occasions, and at times sought to build a strategic dialogue with its member states. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative launched in June 2004 was the most serious and sustained diplomatic effort that drew in the GCC states into questions of regional security, and alignment with NATO. Times were of course different back then. The United States maintained a hegemonic grip on world affairs, Turkey had yet to turn its attentions toward the Arab world, and the Gulf States were largely consumed with mitigating the threat from Iraq’s descent into violence following the removal of Saddam Hussain. There was little need for a NATO-GCC alliance at that time and so, while much was promised, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative never really delivered.

New dynamics at play

Fast forward fifteen years and the situation is quite different. A myriad of revolutions, and conflicts in the area have created a string of weakened and broken states that have become havens for non-state actors, all competing for power and seeking to gain advantage over their rivals. The US is no longer the only player in town, Russia has begun to push its influence into the Mediterranean, and Chinese economic influence has been solidified across the region as Chinese companies buy up infrastructure in Israel, Cyprus, Turkey and Greece.

In response to this shift in the global order the states of the Middle East have formed into distinct blocs, each with competing interests and goals. On the one hand, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Israel, states with strong ties to the West, have largely sought to re-establish a sense of order in the Arab world, by propping up Sisi’s Egypt, and looking to push back against Iran wherever possible. In opposition to this stands the bilateral axis of Turkey and Qatar, again closely tied to the West (and Turkey through NATO). And lastly in opposition to the West, and both the other two axes is the axis of resistance led by Iran, with its mobilisation of non-state actors in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. In recent times there has been an attempt to close the gaps, Qatar’s reintegration into the GCC has cooled the tensions between Doha and its neighbours, and Turkey’s economic struggles have led it to seek a form of rapprochement with the wider Gulf as well. But tensions still remain, and the distrust and the regional encirclement of Turkey continues on apace, exemplified by recent Air Force exercises conducted jointly by Greece and Saudi Arabia.

Security interests

In the case of the Eastern Mediterranean the reason for this game of strategic chess is multifaceted. But its drivers stem primarily from the mutual antipathy that Abu Dhabi and Ankara hold for each other. Their political outlooks could not be more different. Ankara views political Islam as a crucial anchor of Arab politics and regional stability. Abu Dhabi on the other hand views political Islam as an existential threat, that could undo the vision for a prosperous (although apolitical) society that it has tried so hard to build. The reality is that between these two visions of regional order there is no middle ground.

And so, the two have sought to blunt each other at every turn. Turkey has sought to expand its influence into the Gulf by doubling down on its close ally Qatar, and expanded its influence on the western side of the Arabian Peninsula via basing and military infrastructure in Somalia. The UAE has had to respond in kind building bases in Socotra, Djibouti, and strengthening its military cooperation with Israel, Cyprus and Greece.

Both the UAE and Turkey have adopted a variation of “forward defence”, pushing their strategic interests further and further away from their own borders and into weaker states in the surrounding area. The idea being that if the strategic line can be held further away, then the homeland is relatively safe. This explains why both nations fought to an effective stalemate in Libya. Neither Turkey nor the UAE could afford to let their chosen proxies lose the fight for political control, for fear that it would lead to weaknesses being exposed closer to home.

Outside of Libya the UAE has chosen a more structured approach to its alliances, tying its interests to states surrounding Turkey’s periphery that seek common cause in containing Ankara’s influence. The recent normalisation process between the UAE and Israel is in part driven by their mutual frustration with Turkey, and distrust of Iran (amongst other things). But the UAE has also built strong relationships with Cyprus, Greece, and has also encouraged France, the Mediterranean’s pre-eminent power, to be more deeply involved in regional affairs.

The Emiratis and Israelis have been collectively showing support for Greece since as early as 2019, when the fighter jets of all three nations took part in the Iniohos 2019 strategic exercises. Israel maintains broad cooperation with the Greek Air Force and has participated in numerous military exercises of air, sea and ground forces with the Mediterranean country, but the addition of the UAE marked a clear shift in the political balance when viewed within the context of larger regional developments. Saudi Arabia is also increasing its military cooperation with Greece, as demonstrated by the arrival of the Saudi Royal Air Force’s 115th Batallion at the Souda base in Crete for joint exercises with the Greek Armed Forces earlier this month.

Energy and trade interests

Multilateral fora such as the ‘Philia Forum’, consisting of Greece, Cyprus, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE – which last met on 11 February- and the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), created in 2020 have been areas in which the UAE and Saudi Arabia have been able to press their influence. Although the Palestinian Authority rejected the UAE’s observer status to the EMGF, there is little doubt that Abu Dhabi’s influence overhangs the organisation, and the very fact it even applied for observer status signals a conjoining of interests in which Abu Dhabi absolutely believes that oil and gas infrastructure in the area is directly connected to its own national security interests.

UAE interests are not just driven by a focus on Turkey but are reflective of changing global priorities as the geopolitical map shifts away from a Western led order and towards Beijing. As China’s Belt and Road initiative has gathered pace around the Red Sea and the Med, the UAE has complemented this by adopting an aggressive acquisition strategy which has secured its influence as a being at the heart of a number of critical logistics hubs which complement the BRI, forming as one Emirati commentator termed it the “buckle” in the Belt. DP World’s operation of port terminals stretch from Berbera in the Horn of Africa, to Jeddah’s South Container Terminal, to Sokhna in Egypt, Limassol in Cyprus, and Yarimca in Turkey forming a chain of logistic hubs that broadly maps that of Beijing’s. The UAE’s ports strategy may not have originally been designed with BRI in mind, but now it’s there they can hardly ignore that the two nations’ interests neatly overlap in an area that is crucial for global logistics and supply chains.

The Way Forward

The recent interest among the Gulf States, and primarily the UAE, in the Eastern Mediterranean is a product of systemic regional insecurity, economic vision, and changing patterns in geopolitics. Of these three factors only one (regional insecurity) is a temporary condition. Which means that the role of the Gulf States in the Eastern Med will be increasing in the short to medium term. This growing role nevertheless presents risks for Gulf States. While Emirati intentions in the Eastern Med are currently closely aligned with those of France and serve the interests of Greece, other EU States may be less forthcoming at the prospect of Abu Dhabi or Riyadh having an increased leverage on Southern European affairs. Additionally, as demonstrated in Libya, strategic overstretch can prove costly and ineffective. Finally, the Turks are unlikely to give up their battle so lightly, and although suffering economically from the result of bad central bank policy and the effects of the Coronavirus (primarily on their export markets and tourism industry), President Erdogan’s nationalist narrative to paint his nation as being strategically encircled by rivals and enemies remains a source of political strength and domestic popularity, despite his myriad of economic failings.

In the long term the UAE’s investments in civilian infrastructure and logistical hubs in the Eastern Med are likely to pay significant dividends. But both Abu Dhabi and Riyadh should be wary of attempting to do too much too soon in the strategic and political realm given the risk of blowback. For one, trade and investment partnerships with Greece have the potential to create strong commercial bonds, as opposed to military cooperation which risks escalating long-held regional rivalries with Turkey while potentially giving an impression of a security (over-) commitment. Rather than military aid, Israel, Cyprus and Greece require political assurance, investment and a steady hand that can assure the continued prosperity and development of the Eastern Mediterranean region.

There is much to gain by pursuing an economics first strategy at the present time. As the World waits to recover from Covid, those with first-mover advantage in logistics and trade hubs, will surely reap the most benefits. Cross pollinating these benefits with the strategic instability and insecurity of the area will however prove costly and undermine much of what good has been achieved in recent years.

The Biden Administration’s robust diplomatic engagement on Yemen is best understood as central to a broader effort to reassure the international community that the United States is prepared to return to its traditional leadership role on the global stage. The President himself has asserted that he will focus on “reclaiming our credibility and moral authority,” adding that “we must start with diplomacy rooted in America’s most cherished democratic values,” language designed to draw a sharp distinction with the transactional approach to foreign policy favored by the previous administration. The appointment of career diplomat Tim Lenderking as the State Department’s special envoy to the Yemen conflict is further evidence that Washington intends to employ a broad range of diplomatic tools in support of the United Nations-led efforts to achieve a ceasefire and bring the principal parties to the conflict into direct talks. American moral leadership is also being reinforced by the expected confirmation of Samantha Power as the administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Ms. Power was a strong proponent of the “responsibility to protect” doctrine when she served as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations in the Obama administration, and USAID can be expected to ramp up its efforts in Yemen in support of U.S. diplomatic initiatives.

International diplomatic engagement will need to be followed by localized deconfliction efforts, and in parallel, reconstruction and economic development. According to the latest World Bank assessment, reconstruction needs are expected to be around $ 25 billion over the next five years, the bulk of it for housing followed by power and health infrastructure1. In addition to the capital requirements for infrastructure, funds will be needed to run the country until the economy can sustain itself: public sector salaries, social security benefits, and the import of basic commodities will all require outside support.

US national security interests in Yemen

The Biden administration’s re-engagement in Yemen flows from more than just a desire to return to a “values-based” foreign policy. It also reflects a very practical assessment of the extent to which fundamental U.S. national security interests are at stake in the country. These include ensuring the stability of neighboring Gulf Arab countries; maintaining the security of maritime lanes that are essential to global commerce; and preventing terrorist organizations from securing safe haven in Yemen.

The stability of Gulf Arab countries is an important American goal, particularly in the face of continued hostility from Iran. The outsized ability of Saudi Arabia to stabilize global oil markets, and long-standing trade relationships with GCC countries argue strongly for constructive ties, especially at a time when these countries are growing their commercial and security relations with China. President Biden has committed to continuing to support Saudi Arabia “defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity and its people” from the threat posed by the Houthi rebels. Continued close ties with the United Arab Emirates is also a priority for the Biden Administration. Abu Dhabi has broad support in Washington for its moves to normalize relations with Israel via the Abraham Accords, as demonstrated by the recent approval of a $23 Billion weapons sale to the UAE.

Maritime security is another key US concern in the region, and Yemen figures prominently in this regard, given that key international shipping lanes pass immediately to its south and west, via the Bab el Mandeb strait, and the Red Sea. The Bab el Mandeb is a particularly worrisome chokepoint: 18 miles across at its narrowest point, some six million barrels of oil pass through the strait every day, creating enormous potential for the disruption of global energy supplies. The Houthi rebels in Yemen already have conducted attacks against maritime traffic in this region, targeting a UAE vessel and a U.S. guided-missile destroyer in 2016. In 2018, they targeted two Saudi oil tankers, leading Saudi Arabia to temporarily halt oil shipments through the Bab El Mandeb. Attacks on tankers in the port of Jeddah in 2020 were also attributed to the Houthis.

Although weakened, the continued presence in Yemen of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is another national-security concern for the United States, particularly given that AQAP has tried on multiple occasions to conduct attacks against American targets, including an attack against the American Embassy in September 2008 while I was serving as ambassador that left 18 people dead. Subsequently, AQAP engineered two unsuccessful attacks against targets in the United States. The first was on Christmas Day 2009, when a young Nigerian tried unsuccessfully to detonate explosives hidden in his clothing on board an airplane as it began its descent over Detroit, Michigan. The second occurred less than a year later, when toner cartridges filled with explosives were discovered in two airplanes headed for the United States. Since the war began in Yemen, the Yemeni government’s counter-terrorism programs have largely stalled. In 2015, UAE special forces deployed to areas of Yemen known to serve as safe havens for AQAP fighters, and they continue counter-terrorism operations to this day. A small number of U.S. special forces are also on the ground in Yemen, and the United States has conducted aerial attacks against AQAP fighters using armed drones and aircraft.

US position on the conflict and its resolution

The principal interest of the United States in Yemen is to ensure that it does not serve as a platform for destabilizing activities in the region or beyond. In this regard, as part of any peace negotiations, the Houthis will be expected to agree to cease hostile activity in the sea lanes around Yemen, and end missile and drone attacks and cross-border incursions against Saudi territory, in exchange for an end to Saudi airstrikes in Yemen. As government formation in Yemen gets underway, the United States – and the international community more broadly – will press for effective measures to neutralize the threat posed by AQAP; Washington will support these operations, as it has in the past.

The United States has no interest in trying to dictate the outcome of an internal Yemeni political process. In line with this approach, the U.S. will take no position on the future role of Yemeni President AbdRaboo Mansour Hadi, leaving that to the determination of the Yemeni electorate. UN Security Council Resolution 2216 which (ill-advisedly) enshrined Hadi as the legitimate authority in Yemen, is widely seen as an obstacle to a negotiated settlement to the conflict, and the United States will support an initiative in the Security Council to pass a new resolution that reflects the distinctly different situation on the ground that has evolved since 2015. Support from Saudi Arabia and the UAE for a new UNSCR will be important for the legitimacy of this effort.

U.S. thinking is largely aligned with that of the UN Special Envoy in terms of a national-unity government emerging that reflects the realities on the ground in Yemen. Thus, in addition to representatives of the Hadi government, the Houthi rebels, who exercise authority over virtually the entire northern highlands, are likely to receive key ministerial portfolios and, in accordance with the Riyadh Agreement of November 2019, the Aden-based Southern Transitional Council would also be represented in the government. A failure to integrate the Houthi movement in a new national unity government could lead to its continued existence as a heavily armed national militia with its own command-and-control structure, similar to Hezbollah in Lebanon, which would be unacceptable to Yemen’s neighbors, Saudi Arabia in particular.

The opportunity for joint diplomacy

From the beginning, Gulf Arab states – and critics of the JCPOA in the United States – complained that nuclear negotiations with Iran were too narrowly defined and failed to address the threat posed by Iran’s ballistic missiles and its interference in their internal affairs. It seems likely that the US will seek to eventually expand the agenda of this new round of negotiations to include these issues, in addition to those related to Iran’s nuclear weapons. In this regard, any concrete steps taken by Saudi Arabia and other GCC states to end their involvement in the conflict in Yemen will make it easier for the U.S. to insist that Iran do the same.

Reinvigorated US diplomacy in Yemen and a clear commitment to Saudi territorial integrity are strongly supportive of Saudi efforts to end its military involvement in the war and should present an opportunity for close coordination between Washington and Riyadh. The resumption of talks with Iran on a return to the JCPOA provides an opportunity to raise other issues of regional concern, including Iran’s ballistic missiles and its support for Shi’a militia and armed surrogates seeking to destabilize Arab states, including Yemen. Without derailing the nuclear negotiations, the United States should make it clear to Iran that there can be no normalization of relations if it continues to threaten the stability and security of neighboring states.

The Way Forward

The GCC with Saudi Arabia in the lead should make it clear to the Houthi leadership that a de-escalation can be rewarded with economic aid. As efforts towards peace gain momentum, the focus will shift to the long – and costly – process of reconstruction. In particular, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, because of their direct involvement in the war, will be expected to shoulder a substantial portion of the financial burden. The U.S. will also seek to enlist other Gulf Arab states in this effort. In the event a nationwide cease fire is negotiated, the rapid deployment of economic and humanitarian assistance on the ground in Yemen will be essential to prevent armed hostilities from re-igniting anew, extinguishing hopes for an end to the violence. Donor countries – in particular GCC states – should hold out the promise of long-term development aid to neglected regions such as the Saada governorate as an incentive, just as the U.S. is doing with Iran for economic relief. Additional funds could be made available to support projects linked to water, health and education infrastructure once the Houthis demonstrate a willingness to engage in a political process and cease their military campaign. While Saudi Arabia has been the largest donor to Yemen since the beginning of the war, its assistance has been largely constrained to areas not under Houthi control, for obvious reasons. A substantial portion of the reconstruction effort going forward will have to be focused in the north of the country, where 70% of the population lives and where civilian infrastructure has been most damaged. This should also theoretically stem grievances that have contributed to the Houthis’ rise to power, which has been ascribed to the lack of economic development in the governorate of Saada, in addition to resentment over the post-1960 disempowerment of the Sada (Sayyids), who claim descent from the Prophet Mohammed and who had historically ruled the region. Reconstruction of the northern highlands will require stringent monitoring mechanisms and have to be under a UN framework. GCC states should also start exploring additional aid mechanisms, beyond funds: integrating Yemen’s electricity grid with that of the GCC or admitting Yemeni workers could go a long way in supporting economic development in Yemen while benefiting GCC economies. Similarly, creating an economic free zone along Yemen’s northern border might help restore once-thriving cross-border trade and economic activity between Saada and southern Saudi Arabia.

Regarding Iran, Gulf Arab states should also expect the U.S. to encourage them to imagine ways in which they can accommodate greater integration of the Islamic republic into the region, a position not unlike that which underpinned the Obama administration’s nuclear deal with Iran. While some Gulf states already have fairly strong commercial ties with the regime in Tehran, there is still considerable anxiety among others regarding Iran’s revolutionary zeal and whether its theocratic leadership and Revolutionary Guard Corps can ever accept peaceful coexistence with their Arab neighbors. This anxiety is not always readily understood in Washington, and discussions between the U.S. and Gulf Arab states on this issue will need to be candid and clear in order to avoid misapprehensions on either side.

The views expressed in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the US Government.

An election outcome with a victorious Trump will see him insist that in return for maintaining strong relations the Gulf states must continue purchasing weapons, make investments in America, pay for US military assistance, limit oil production to help the US energy industry, and establish more open ties with Israel.  Unlike Trump, Joe Biden–as his principal advisor Anthony Blinken has indicated–will be guided by a return to the Obama policy of appeasing Iran, restricting arms sales to the GCC, insisting on a quick end to the war in Yemen and, finally, the upholding of human rights, especially for women.  Whatever the outcome of the election, and despite their differences, both Republicans and Democrats will also have to accommodate an American public that is exhausted by overseas military interventions and seeks to diminish the US’s global footprint, in particular in the Middle East.  The GCC countries will have to contend with all these competing views and demands.

America’s isolationist impulse is reinforced by the public’s view that the US has become energy self-sufficient because of the shale oil and gas revolution of the last decade–the dominant feeling is that the Middle East’s energy reserves have become unnecessary for America’s economic wellbeing.  This is a mistaken assessment since oil remains a globally priced commodity and Middle Eastern production–in particular the volume of output from the GCC–remains vital to the welfare and survival of US producers as well as to the stability of the global economy. The oil price crisis in March 2020 illustrated this point well with the result that Trump had to appeal, repeatedly, to Saudi Arabia to cut production to help save the US energy industry. Like Trump, Biden also understands this fundamental feature of energy markets and will therefore be cautious not to alienate the Kingdom and its Gulf allies. Still, America’s isolationist impulse is getting stronger and in practice this will mean that the US will be a less reliable partner for the GCC regardless of who is in power in the White House.

Congress

The November election is not only about the fate of the presidency. Which political party gains a majority in Congress will also have consequences on American policies toward the GCC. For instance, a Democrat majority in the Senate will certainly lead to considerable pressure to restrict arms sales to the GCC countries as well as to insist on human rights as an important element in foreign policy. The Democrats are also more likely to side with Qatar, which has cultivated them very actively since 2017.  Whereas the continuation of a Republican majority in the Senate will mean that such restrictions and pressures will not be exerted.  In short, Republicans are stronger supporters of maintaining robust bilateral ties with the GCC countries, and they are more vigilant about containing Iran and restricting Russian and especially Chinese influence in the Gulf.

Iran

President Trump’s principal advisors on the Gulf and Iran—Jared Kushner, Mike Pompeo and Elliot Abrams—are all strong advocates of closer relations with the GCC and are hawks when it comes to Iran. Yet, Trump might still try to obtain a meeting with the Iranian president, mainly as a publicity stunt—his public image as an international negotiator remains a top priority. Even so, without a renegotiated and broad agreement with Iran, one that goes beyond the nuclear issues, Trump will not lessen the economic sanctions against Tehran.  Iran will have to provide substantive concessions in a revamped deal of the nuclear agreement (JCPOA). Such concessions would involve, in addition to more restrictions on the nuclear program, limitations on ballistic missile production as well as drone and cruise missiles, and a reduction of support for proxy groups around the region (e.g., the Houthis and Hezbollah). All this will involve high sacrifices for Iran and thus a new deal with Trump is very unlikely to be concluded.

Similarly, a quick resumption of the JCPOA deal between Iran and the Democrats cannot be taken as a given. Although the Democrats wish to re-join the JCPOA, doing so will not be easy because Iran will insist on a new set of conditions that Biden cannot simply agree to.  First, Iran will demand a form of reparations to compensate for the punitive regime it had to endure under Trump. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is poised to take over fully the regime in Tehran, will insist on this. Second, Iran is perceived by many Americans as having negotiated the nuclear deal in bad faith. It used the funds it received from the Obama administration to entrench further its influence and domination over Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and parts of Yemen. In each of these it has spent billions of dollars supporting its proxies, providing weapons and training. Furthermore, Tehran has continued to develop its missile and drone programs, whose remarkable efficacy and destructiveness was on full display during the 14 September 2019 attack on the Saudi oil installations. And while it can be argued that Iran has done all this to protect itself from American, Israeli and Saudi hostility, it is broadly identified in the US as a destabilizing actor in the region and with a clear aim to see the US withdraw completely from the Gulf.  Biden will not be able to pretend, as the Obama administration often hinted, that a renewed agreement will help change the nature of the Mullah’s regime. And this is all the more so as the IRGC openly becomes the dominant actor in Tehran.

The UAE, Bahrain and Israel Agreements

The recent agreements to establish a formal relationship between Israel and the UAE as well as with Bahrain are widely perceived as a gift for Trump since he can claim this as a foreign policy win before the November elections.  However, these agreements are also supported by Biden since any US president must be in favour of normalization and peace between Arab countries and Israel. These agreements are ultimately driven by the state and security interest of the Gulf states and Israel and not by US electoral considerations. These countries want to break with the paralyzing political dynamics of the past—those centred on Arab nationalism, resistance to the West and the Palestinian cause–and wish to build a prosperous future based on commerce, technological innovation, and mutual security. This breakthrough also has the tacit blessing of Saudi Arabia and represents a major development for the region. Other countries such as Oman are likely to follow in the UAE and Bahrain’s footsteps, although not Saudi Arabia because of its status as global Muslim leader and because its own population is not ready for such a dramatic change in foreign policy. These agreements bring into the open the split between the major countries of the Middle East. On one side are Turkey, Iran and Qatar all hoping that the forces of Islamism and anti-Westernism will prevail, despite the significant differences between them. On the other side are the UAE, Bahrain, Israel, Saudi Arabia as well as Jordan and Egypt who wish to maintain American hegemony over the region.  If Trump wins, the pro-American side led by Israel and the UAE will be given a huge boost and the divisions between the two camp will become more prominent. One consequence of this is that Turkey and Qatar will be pressurized by Trump to choose sides. A Democratic win is likely to give the Turkish and Qatari-led camp more leeway to continue pursuing their Islamist policies.

The way forward (the Biden hedge)

A Biden victory will mean that America will become a less reliable ally for the GCC countries, especially for Saudi Arabia, and the US will generally reduce its involvement in the Middle East. This could spell greater instability for the region. It is not a coincidence that the Obama period was accompanied by the period of greatest chaos in the region—the Arab Spring and its effects–and this was in part because Obama signalled a reduction of involvement by the US in the region’s affairs. A similar dynamic under Biden will strengthen the already existing policies of Gulf states to hedge their position by diversifying their international relationships, in particular with China. The regimes’ security and survival will become an even greater priority. More than increased commercial relations with China, we will see even more weapons systems being bought from China and joint manufacturing of these in the Gulf, as well as greater collaborations on major infrastructure projects such as nuclear and solar power and the mining of minerals. The Chinese are already in the enviable position of having both Iran and the GCC bidding for greater cooperation and exchange while the US sees its influence receding.

A Biden administration, which resumes negotiations with Iran, will put pressure on Saudi Arabia to end the war in Yemen as well as restrict arms sales. This is one reason why an immediate Saudi push to end the war in Yemen will help pre-empt the Democrats. This can help create an opening for Riyadh to cultivate the Democrats who feel resentful by the exclusive relationship Saudi Arabia has fostered with Trump. The release of political prisoners before the election in November is also another way to pacify the Democrats and other critics in the West. Of course, a Saudi agreement with Israel before the November elections would force the Democrats to adopt a more positive policy vis-à-vis the Kingdom, but this is unlikely to happen for the reasons mentioned earlier.  As a rule, it is always best for the GCC countries not to be identified too closely with one party in the US but instead to try to cultivate bi-partisan support. The November election offers an opportunity to do just this—build constituencies across the political divide in America that see long-term value in maintaining robust and strategic relations with the GCC.

Perhaps one of the most ambitious development projects in recent history will be the roll-out of the 900bn US$ Belt and Road Initiative[i]. China’s goal to become the leading world power will not only increase China’s global role, it will also have decisive impacts for the Middle East as the region is an integral part of the Western axis of the BRI. This requires adapted security and foreign policies in the Middle East to utilize the opportunities from BRI but also to manage the risks of a world, which is further shifting towards the East in the coming years and decades. If the Middle East positions itself carefully, it can greatly benefit from this shifting world order. In order for this to happen, the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) must understand their crucial role to steer the Middle East in this geopolitical transition.

What is the Belt and Road Initiative

During official state visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia, China’s President Xi Jinping announced the Belt and Road Initiative in the autumn of 2013. With its objectives ‘to construct a unified large market and make full use of both international and domestic markets, through cultural exchange and integration, to enhance mutual understanding and trust of member nations, ending up in an innovative pattern with capital inflows, talent pool and technology database‘, the BRI is one of the largest infrastructure projects in history covering two thirds of the world’s population across 68 countries[ii]

It is divided in a main axis with two wings, one in the West and the other one in the East. While the main axis integrates much of Central Asia, the Indian sub-continent, the ASEAN countries and Oceania, the Eastern wing is largely confined to Latin and Central America. The by far most ambitious part of the BRI will be the Western wing as it seeks to integrate three highly diverse world regions in terms of economic prosperity, political systems, culture and population growth: Africa, Europe and the Middle East.

China seeks to connect the countries along the Western axis mainly through infrastructure developments such as new roads, maritime infrastructure and railways. This is intended to reduce export and import time for countries trading with China. In particular, the Western axis is based on railway and road networks from China to Western Europe and through maritime routes to Africa. A key element within the maritime strategy is to build ports such as in Gwadar (Pakistan) and Lamu (Kenya) to establish faster trade between the two world regions[iii]. In the Arab world, Egypt is considered as the key beneficiary of the maritime part of the BRI as the Suez Canal will once again see an increase of shipping movements. Another country to benefit will be Iran as a corridor for railways. It already enjoys close political relationships with Beijing[iv]. However, this also means that the BRI will have profound geopolitical implications for the MENA region.

Geopolitical impacts on the Middle East

MENA will be the de-facto energy hub for the Western axis if not for the entire BRI. GCC States will once again be able to bring their hydrocarbon assets to the table to energize the initiative. At the same time, ports in the GCC are expected to benefit from increased shipments of oil and gas to the East and Africa. This provides the region with both opportunities but also more challenges. The geostrategic bottleneck of the Strait of Hormuz will yet again increase. Maritime security will not only remain a key challenge there but also in the Arab Sea and the Red Sea as vessels will have to be protected from pirates. The lack of maritime institutions in the Indian Ocean region will further add to the challenges of governments in the MENA region as countries have no political mechanism to avoid competition. Hence, GCC governments will further have to invest in their military to procure the necessary infrastructure to protect their sea routes.

Risks and Opportunities of the BRI for MENA

This may further increase existing tensions between the GCC and Iran as both actors in the region may have opposing interests. In an increasingly armed region, such diverging interests increase the risk of sustained conflict, either directly or through proxies. Moreover, terrorist activity could severely impact successful trade in the other bottleneck: the Suez Canal[v]. There will therefore be no alternative for the GCC economies to provide further strategic aid to Egypt to maintain stability in the Arab Republic. Moreover, America’s future role in the MENA region will add to the complexities: with sustained low oil prices, America’s ambition for energy independence may be in jeopardy, requiring it to maintain a military presence in the Gulf, while China may decide to send further troops to the MENA region to protect its interests. This may have a potential for political competition with Washington. Last but not least, Russia’s increasing presence in the Levant and Turkey’s geopolitical interests will add to the political tinder box. This will all have to be carefully managed through political institutions across countries in the region.

However, there are of course other, currently untapped opportunities resulting from the BRI. China may or may not decide to increase its military presence in the region. If it doesn’t, as the stakes could be too high to confront the United States, the GCC in particular will have a window of opportunity to establish themselves as a political actor within the Western axis of the BRI. This means nothing less but a new geopolitical role for the MENA region. It can choose to use its intermediary geographical location and position as the key energy provider to China but also Africa to set itself up as a global player akin to Europe or North America.

Conclusions

The BRI will define the coming years and decades in many countries of the world. The MENA region is affected in a number of ways. The GCC are likely to remain a key energy provider in such a new world order, yet it will have to address potential conflict areas such as intraregional rivalries, maritime security and terrorism. The region will have to manage the risks but also the opportunities such as becoming a vital political actor within the Western axis of the BRI. Such shifts will not be easy to navigate but they present the region with an opportunity to transform itself to a global player that can grow as part of the BRI.

[i]  Deloitte, 2018. Embracing the BRI Ecosystem in 2018. Online: https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/economy/asia-pacific/china-belt-and-road-initiative.html

[ii] Tsang Group, 2019. What is One Belt One Road Initiatve. Online: https://tsangsgroup.co/areas-of-expertise/what-is-one-belt-one-road-initiative/

[iii] Deloitte, 2018. Embracing the BRI Ecosystem in 2018. Online: https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/economy/asia-pacific/china-belt-and-road-initiative.html

[iv] Maha S. Kamel (2018) China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for the Middle East, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 31:1, 76-95, DOI: 10.1080/09557571.2018.1480592

[v] Ibid